Research

Why do some rebel groups successfully transform into viable political parties and achieve widespread electoral support after conflict while others do not? This paper examines whether and how governance activities of rebel groups during war affect rebel political participation and political performance after war. Rebel groups often develop governance structures during war, but the rebel governance structures vary depending on the extent to which they include participatory arrangements. Some rebel groups allow civilian participation in their governance during the war, while others have highly hierarchical structures strictly limiting civilian participation. I argue that both participatory and non-participatory governance shape their political participation after war as they promote public support and organizational skills. However, I argue that participatory governance is particularly effective in rebel political performance as it helps rebel groups secure voluntary support, which is convertible to electoral support after conflict ends. Using rebel political participation data between 1945 and 2020, I find strong empirical support for my argument. By establishing a strong positive empirical relationship between rebel wartime governance and rebel transformation, this paper identifies another important effect of rebel governance on post-conflict politics in addition to its demonstrated effect on negotiations between warring parties and post-war democratization.

In the past few decades, there has been a rise in the instances of rebel groups conducting their own elections during wartime. Rebel elections have garnered significant attention from scholars due to their potential association with the establishment of democracy and the duration of peace in post-conflict settings. To examine the reasons behind rebel elections, current research has primarily focused on the motivation of insurgent group leaders who aim to legitimize their power in the view of local populations and international actors. Despite the importance of understanding the motivation of rebel group leaders, it is insufficient to fully explain their occurrence, as these leaders may lack the necessary knowledge or institutional background to effectively carry out elections. We address this theoretical void by exploring the domestic and international factors that create opportunities for insurgent groups to carry out elections. First, we argue that the rebel groups having greater engagement with democratic states are more likely to discover opportunities for elections at the global level.  Interactions with democratic countries can introduce rebel groups to democratic norms and practices that they can then embrace into their own election processes. Secondly, however, not all insurgent groups can effectively seize the opportunities presented by external actors. We argue that the pre-existing organizational capabilities of a rebel group play a crucial role in determining the success of converting engagements with democracies into the execution of elections. Our analysis of rebel group elections from 1975-2012 supports our arguments.  The rebel groups that have received external support from democratic countries are more likely to hold elections. The increasing trend of rebel elections is also consistent with the diffusion of democracies at the global level. However, as expected, its impact was heterogeneous: when external support from democracies was given, the rebel groups with higher capabilities of governance in other dimensions, such as taxing, education, policing, and housing, had a greater tendency to execute elections. By establishing a strong positive empirical relationship between external support from democratic countries and rebel elections, this paper identifies opportunities enabling rebel groups to introduce democratic practices as another important driving force for rebel elections in addition to groups' motivations for it.

How governments respond to the demands of rebel groups is crucial for peaceful negotiations to occur. Yet, we have a limited understanding of why governments offer generous concessions to some rebel groups but not to others. I argue that the way rebel groups exploit natural resources influences the incentives of states to offer concessions. Rebel groups that engage in smuggling will receive fewer concessions than other rebel groups that do not because smuggling increases government's fear of rebel groups defecting. Smuggling also decreases government concessions because rebel groups that rely on smuggling as a source of income have low levels of legitimacy, meaning that governments might distrust a rebel group's purpose. Lastly, negative reputation of smuggling groups also renders domestic and international actors to push the government not to provide concessions. Analyzing government concessions to rebel groups in African countries between 1990-2009, I find that smuggling decreases the number of concessions that government extends to rebel groups. This implies that the way of exploiting natural resources may affect government's decision-making and its response to rebel groups. This paper enhances our understanding of conflict dynamics by offering the role of rebel groups' funding strategies and their impact on the conflict bargaining process. It also has implications for international actors promoting peaceful settlement in conflict regions.